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Abstract
Inter-rater reliability can be regarded as the degree of agreement among raters on a given item or a circumstance.
Multiple approaches have been taken to estimate and improve inter-rater reliability of the United States Department
of Defense Human Factors Analysis and Classification System used by trained accident investigators. In this study,
three trained instructor pilots used the DoD-HFACS to classify 347 U.S. Air Force Accident Investigation Board
(AIB) Class-A reports between the years of 2000 and 2013. The overall method consisted of four steps: (1) train on
HFACS definitions, (2) verify rating reliability, (3) rate HFACS reports, and (4) random sample to validate ratings
reliability. Attribute agreement analysis was used as the method to assess inter-rater reliability. In the final training
verification round, within appraiser agreement ranged 85.28% to 93.25%, each appraiser versus the standard ranged
77.91% to 82.82%, between appraisers 72.39%, and all appraisers versus the standard was 67.48%. Corresponding
agreement for the random sample of HFACS rated summaries were within appraiser 78.89% to 92.78% and between
appraisers 53.33%, which is consistent with prior studies. This pilot study indicates that the train-verify-rate-validate
attribute agreement analysis approach has the potential to aid in improving HFACS ratings reliability and contributing
to accurately capturing human factors contributions to aircraft mishaps. Additional full-scale studies will be required
to verify and fully develop the proposed methodology.

Keywords
Accident Investigation, HFACS, Inner-rater Reliability

Introduction
Reason (1990) Accident Causation Model, also known as the Swiss Cheese Model, is a theoretical model that seeks
to explain how accidents manifest across organizational levels. The model’s main assumption is that accidents occur
in such a way that the causes have relationships across organizational levels. A second assumption is that, at minimum,
organizational levels need to function together to prevent accidents. From these assumptions, Reason theorizes that
most accidents can be traced to active and latent human failures resulting from prior latent human failures at higher
organizational levels. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), originally adapted from
Reason’s model to aviation by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), identifies four tier levels within an organization at
which human errors can occur: Organizational Influences, Unsafe Supervision, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, and
Unsafe Acts. The HFACS has been used by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) since 2005, (DOD, 2005)
as DOD HFACS with some changes especially at the levels of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Acts. The
DOD HFACS (2005) is composed of the 4 main tier, 14 sub-categories (referred to as category in the Wiegmann and
Shappell study), and 147 nanocodes for detailed classification of organizational human errors contributing to aircraft
accidents. .
There have been many studies toward the development of accident causation models and frameworks due to
desire for decreasing human errors in aviation accidents that result in fatalities and cost a great amount of resources
in terms of investigation time, loss of aircraft assets, and litigation. (Yesilbas & Cotter, 2014) Among these studies,
no particular or a notable method has been found for evaluation or testing the HFACS taxonomy for validity and rater
reliability. Given the HFACS’s central role in classifying human errors that contribute to aviation accidents, its
validity and the raters’ reliability constitutes a substantial function that empower to comprehend the real cause of the
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accidents and thus enable proper intervention strategies in terms of organizational safety. For the HFACS to be a
useful tool in tracking human causes of aircraft mishaps and providing feedback on the effectiveness of corrective
measures, investigators must be able to rate the reports accurately and reliably. Figure 1 depicts the HFACS (2003)
and its adopted form DOD HFACS (2005) including tiers, categories and related sub-categories. This study used the
DOD HFACS (2005) form as it was the latest version when the research had started.
Exhibit 1. Schematic comparison of HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003) and DOD HFACS (DOD, 2005)
(Each of the boxes breakdown to respected nanocodes of human error)

A recent review by Cohen, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2015) examined 111 HFACS manuscripts of which 14
peer-reviewed articles reported rater reliability of HFACS. Notably however: only six of these 14 articles were
specifically designed to test reliability. Among the six studies that were designed to assess inter- and/ or intra-rater
reliability, three of them demonstrated acceptable levels of reliability and the others showed less reliability. Another
recent study by Ergai et al. (2016), examined the inter- and intra-rater reliability of the HFACS data classification
process. Results revealed the HFACS taxonomy to be reliable in terms of inter- and intra-rater reliability, with the
latter producing slightly higher Alpha values. The study by Ergai et al. assessed the reliability of the HFACS
framework as a general accident analysis tool using a large number of trained coders and multiple real-world accident
causal factors from a variety of industries. According to Cohen et al. (2015) the reason for these variable results were
inadequate training of coders, the use of a small number of accident cases/causal factors, unnecessary modifications
made to the HFACS framework, and an inconsistency in the methods used to assess both inter- and intra-rater
reliabilities. Another but also substantial reason for this is the lack of a particular method for inter- and intra-rater
reliability that needs to include training, testing and evaluation processes. Such a comprehensive methodology can
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increase the reliability and establish a desired level of consensus between the inter-rater reliability studies of HFACS
that can be compared and improved.
The studies for rater reliability of HFACS depict the need for utilizing HFACS in a more reliable way for
further studies in aviation and a variety of other areas as well. This paper reports a pilot study in applying attribute
agreement analysis as the measurement tool used to provide feedback during the training of aviators and their
subsequent validation in the classification of aircraft mishaps within the HFACS framework.

Methods
Attribute agreement analysis is used to evaluate agreement of assignment to nominal categories or ordinal ratings by
multiple appraisers and to determine how likely the appraiser measurement system is to misclassify a part. Attribute
agreement analysis provides information on:
• The proportion of cases that each appraiser agrees with himself or herself over all trials (precision).
• The proportion of cases in which each appraiser agrees with a known standard over all trials (individual
bias).
• The proportion of cases in which all appraisers agree with themselves (within appraiser repeatability)
and with other appraisers (between appraisers reproducibility) over all trials.
• The proportion of cases that all appraisers agree with themselves, with other appraisers, and with the
standard over all trials (joint appraiser bias).
There are two primary assessments of attribute agreement:
• The proportion of cases in which the appraisers agree with the standard.
• The proportion of cases in which the appraisers agree with the standard adjusted for the proportion of
agreement by chance (various kappa statistics).
Substantial agreement among the raters indicates rating accuracy and reliability. Accuracy is measured individually
as the proportion of cases in which each appraiser agrees with the standard and systemically as the proportion of cases
in which all appraisers agree with the standard. Inter-rater reliability is regarded as the degree of agreement among
raters on a given item or a circumstance. When performing the actual attribute agreement analysis with ordinal data,
in addition to the percentage of agreement, Fleiss' kappa statistics and corresponding p-values (reliability estimates)
can be used to jointly support the argument of meeting stated minimum agreement requirements. Fleiss’ kappa statistic
(1971) measures how well the appraisers agree for each standard response with 1.0 indicating perfect agreement, 0
indicating agreement not different from pure chance, and < 0 indicating weaker than expected by pure chance.
The data for this study came from United States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site (USAF
Accident Investigation Boards, 2012). The United States Air Force Legal Operations Agency web site database
presents summary and detailed accident reports based on the investigation findings including human factors. This
database contained a list of Class A aerospace and ground mishaps and their corresponding summaries and full
narratives from the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) of USAF reports between the years of 2000 and 2013. These
accidents involved aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft, space systems, and missiles. The majority of the reports in the
database include only the executive summaries of the accidents, which may be due to the information being classified
and not intended to be shared with the public. An accident report is listed on this site after approval of the USAF
Accident Investigation Board. Class A accident reports were used, because they present the most comprehensive
information and are prepared with a high level of expertise. This study acquired manned and unmanned aircraft
HFACS accident classification data from 347 reports of which 75 detailed accident reports were available for the years
between 2010 and 2013. Exhibit 2 summarizes the assignment scheme by HFACS main and category levels and the
code assignments to each category.
Rater Training and Reliability Analysis Design
This research’s objective was to test the effectiveness of applying attribute agreement analysis as a feedback tool
during training on applying HFACS nanocodes to aircraft incidents and as a measurement tool of inter-rater reliability
upon completion of training. The general research method was:
1. Train pilot participants on a random sample of the USAF detailed accident reports.
2. Have the participants rate a random sample of detailed accident reports based only on the summaries and
measure inter-rater reliability relative to the nanocodes assigned originally by the expert investigators using
attribute agreement analysis.
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 until the participant raters reach a pre-specified agreement rate.
4. Have one trainee assign HFACS nanocodes to the USAF accident summary reports.
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Have all pilot participants rate a random sample of the assigned USAF accident summary reports from step
4 and determine the inter-rater agreement rates by attribute agreement analysis.
Exhibit 2. Levels, Categories, Respective Number Of Nanocodes And Abbreviations Used In The Analysis
CATEGORY

LEVELS

Organizational
Influences (O)

CODE

Resource/Acquisition Management

OR

9

Organizational Climate

OC

5

Organizational Processes

OP

6

Dummy Variable

OD

1

Total Number of Nanocodes in Organizational Influences

Unsafe Supervision (S)

SI

6

Planned Inappropriate Operations

SP

7

Failed to Correct Known Problem

SF

2

Supervisory Violations

SV

4

Dummy Variable

SD

1
19+1

Environmental Factors

PE

19

Condition of Individuals

PC

55

Personal Factors

PP

18

Dummy Variable

PD

1

Total Number of Nanocodes in Preconditions for Unsafe Acts

Acts (A)

20+1

Inadequate Supervision

Total Number of Nanocodes in Unsafe Supervision

Preconditions for Unsafe
Acts (P)

Number of HFACS
Nanocodes

92+1

Skill-Based Errors

AE1

6

Judgment & Decision-Making
Errors

AE2

6

Misperception Errors

AE3

1

Violations

AV

3

Dummy Variable

AD

1

Total Number of Nanocodes in Acts

16+1

Total number of DOD HFACS Nanocodes and Dummy Variables

147+4
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Using this research method, the fundamental sampling question addressed was the accuracy and repeatability
with which the one participant classified each of the remaining 272 accident summaries within the HFACS system
relative to the known classification by the panels of “experts” in the 75 detailed accident reports.
The sampling design to establish and verify rater reliability was as follows:
1. The sample of n = 30 detailed accident reports were randomly selected from the population of N = 75 detailed
reports by the independent researcher. The remaining 45 detailed reports were randomly assigned to two
categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing by the independent researcher with 15 reports unassigned.
2. One pilot participant was assigned as the test subject and the remaining two were assigned as reference
subjects.
3. The pilot participants jointly established classification criteria from the 10 training detailed accident reports.
Initial training included the joint review of the DOD HFACS taxonomy including some sample detailed
accident reports. Next, the pilot participants reviewed the 10 training detailed accident reports jointly. While
some reports included “causal”, “contributory”, “non-contributory” classification, most of the detailed
reports provided all relative causes with respective nanocode(s). As the executive summaries of the reports
did not include the “non-contributory” factors, it would not be possible to infer any cause. To this end, the
raters decided to classify the all human errors found as causal factors without making any further sorting as
“causal” or “contributory.” The presence of any cause was assigned an HFACS nanocode within its
respective category. For the reports in which a nanocode was not assigned within a category a letter D was
entered to the respective level as assignment to the category’s dummy variable.
4. The pilot participants independently classified accident causes from the summaries of 10 testing accident
reports in accordance with the established HFACS nanocodes classification criteria in two randomly ordered
replicates. The independent researcher classified the assigned nanocodes into the HFACS category codes
specified in Exhibit 2.
5. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted on the classifications. If the measurement metrics Each
Appraiser versus Expert Standard > 50%, All Appraisers versus Expert Standard > 50%, and Between
Appraiser agreement > 50%, the test subject pilot participant would proceed to Step 6. If any one of the
measurement metrics < 50%, the remaining 45 detailed reports would be randomly re-assigned to two
categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing. Step 3 would be repeated updating the joint classification criteria
to include new information. Step 4 would be repeated on the new set of 10 testing reports. Attribute
agreement analysis in this step would be conducted evaluating for all measurement metrics > 50%.
6. The pilot participants independently classified accident causes of the summaries of the n = 30 detailed
accident reports in accordance with the established HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered
replicates. The independent researcher classified the assigned nanocodes into the HFACS category codes
specified in Exhibit 2. Attribute agreement analysis was conducted evaluating for Each Appraiser versus
Expert Standard > 50%, All Appraisers versus Expert Standard > 50%, and Between Appraiser agreement >
50%. If this set of criteria was not met, the process would return to Step 1 and the remaining 45 detailed
reports would be randomly re-assigned to two categories: 10 to training and 20 to testing. Steps 3 to 6 were
iterated until the set of criteria was met. Once all agreement criteria were met, the test subject pilot participant
proceeded to classification in Step 7.
7. The test subject pilot participant classified accident causes of the remaining 272 summary reports in
accordance with established HFACS criteria.
8. Upon completion of the classification, a random sample of n = 30 was selected from the 272 summary reports
classified by the test subject pilot participant. Using the established classification criteria, the n = 30 summary
reports were submitted in random order to the test subject pilot participant for re-classification and to the two
reference pilot participants who independently classified accident causes in accordance with the established
HFACS classification criteria in two randomly ordered replicates. The independent researcher classified the
assigned nanocodes into the HFACS category codes specified in Exhibit 2. Attribute agreement analysis
was conducted and meeting the set of criteria in Step 6 indicated acceptable training and classification
capacity of the test subject pilot participant.
This sampling design modeled training a new accident investigation rater and validating his or her reliability against
that of at least two “certified” investigators. Minitab® (version 16.2.1) statistical analysis software was used for all
attribute agreement analyses.
Since human subject information was not part of the crash data and the pilot participants provided rating
information only about the crash data and did not include any human subject data about themselves, the study was
judged to be exempt from review by the Old Dominion University Institutional Review Board (IRB). For attribute
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agreement analysis, an “N” code was added to represent disagreement by a researcher with himself between replicates
or with other raters. For example, at the Organizational Influences level a code sequence of
USAF
OR
OR
OR

R1-1
OR
N
N

R1-2
N
OP
N

R2-1
N
OP
N

R2-2
N
OP
N

R3-1
OR
N
N

R3-2
N
N
OD

for a given accident summary indicated that the USAF investigators assigned the Organization level cause as OR =
Organizational Resource Management, rater R1 assigned OR on the first replicate but changed to OP = Organizational
Process on the second replicate, rater R2 assigned OP on replicate one and two, and rate R3 assigned OR on the first
replicate and OD = Dummy or no assignment on the second replicate.

Results
Round One Attribute Agreement Analysis
At the DOD HFACS category level, the preliminary percentage of agreement results of round one classification of the
summaries of 10 testing accident reports in step 4 above showed acceptable Within Appraisers repeatability of 96.15%,
82.69%, and 73.08% respectively and acceptable between appraisers agreement of 53.85%. However, for Each
Appraiser versus Standard, raters one and two exhibited acceptable agreement at 71.15% and 63.46% respectively.
Rater three agreed with the standard only 46.15%, which was less than the specified 50% average. After these results,
the raters reviewed the same accident reports to identify the differences in code assignments, agree on the correct
assignment per report, and the criteria for each assignment. The results of Round One analysis are presented in Exhibit
3. Two factors were identified as the causes for this low level of agreement. First, it was the initial part of independent
study, and the raters did not think that they had sufficient understanding of the HFACS classification code definitions.
Second, they thought that including as many nanocodes as possible would contribute in finding the causes of the
accidents. However, it appears that including more nanocodes than required decreased the level of agreement.
Round Two Attribute Agreement Analysis
The pilot participants performed round two attribute agreement analysis on an additional 10 randomly selected
accident summaries classifying two replicates with approximately a one-week interval between replicates. The
Assessment Agreement results of Round Two are shown in Exhibit 3. The Within Appraisers, Each Appraiser versus
Standard, Between Appraisers, and All Appraisers versus Standard agreement percentages were all above the specified
50% average.
Round Three Attribute Agreement Analysis
The research proceeded to step 6 in which the pilot participants were to independently classify accident causes of the
summaries of the n = 30 detailed accident in two randomly ordered replicates. However, two detailed accident reports
were found to be insufficient quality in the detail of their descriptions to admit them for classification. Rather than
replace these two reports with two randomly selected from the 15 remainder of the second group of 45, the researchers
decided to discard these reports rather than risk compromising the original random assignment.
The remaining n = 28 executive summaries of detailed accident reports were randomly assigned and rated in
two replicates by the pilot participants with approximately a one-week interval between replicates. The Assessment
Agreement results of Round Three are shown in Exhibit 3. The raters’ Within Appraisers, Each Appraiser versus
Standard, Between Appraisers, and All Appraisers versus Standard agreement percentages were all above specified
50% average. The results from Round Three were assessed to be sufficient to continue to step 7 in which the test
subject pilot participant classified accident causes of the remaining 272 summary reports.
Evaluation of the Remaining Reports
The remaining 272 summary reports with no detailed accident information were classified by the test subject pilot
participant in accordance with established HFACS criteria. In accordance with step 8, after all reports were classified,
n = 30 executive summaries were randomly selected and classified in two replicates by all participant pilots with
approximately a one-week interval between replicates. The Round Four inter-rater attribute agreement analysis results
are shown in Exhibit 3. The raters’ Within Appraisers and Between Appraisers agreement percentages were all above
specified 50% average.
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Exhibit 3. Attribute Agreement Analysis of HFACS Category Nanocode Assignments
Assessment Agreement

Appraiser

# Inspected

# Matched

Percent

95 % CI

Rater1

52

50

96.15 (86.79, 99.53)

Rater2

52

43

82.69 (69.67, 91.77)

Rater3

52

38

73.08 (58.98, 84.43)

Rater1

52

37

71.15 (56.92, 82.87)

Rater2

52

33

63.46 (48.96, 76.38)

Rater3

53

24

46.15 (32.23, 60.53)

Between Appraisers

52

28

53.85 (39.47, 67.77)

All Appraisers vs. Std.

52

23

44.23 (30.47, 58.67)

Rater1

57

54

94.74 (85.38, 98.90)

Rater2

57

53

92.98 (83.00, 98.05)

Rater3

57

48

84.21 (72.13, 92.52)

Rater1

57

50

87.72 (76.32, 94.92)

Rater2

57

51

89.47 (78.48, 96.04)

Rater3

57

47

82.46 (70.09, 91.25)

Between Appraisers

57

44

77.19 (64.16, 87.26)

All Appraisers vs. Standard

57

43

75.44 (62.24, 85.87)

Rater1

163

144

88.34 (82.40, 92.83)

Rater2

163

152

93.25 (88.25, 96.58)

Rater3

163

139

85.28 (78.89, 90.33)

Rater1

163

133

81.60 (74.78, 87.22)

Rater2

163

135

82.82 (76.14, 88.27)

Rater3

163

127

77.91 (70.76, 84.03)

Between Appraisers

163

118

72.39 (64.86, 79.10)

All Appraisers vs. Std.

163

110

67.48 (59.72, 74.60)

Rater1

180

143

79.44 (72.80, 85.09)

Rater2

180

167

92.78 (87.97, 96.10)

Rater3

180

142

78.89 (72.19, 84.61)

180

96

53.33 (45.76, 60.79)

Round 1

Within Appraisers

Each Appraiser vs. Std.

Round 2

Within Appraisers

Each Appraiser vs. Std.

Round 3

Within Appraisers

Each Appraiser vs. Std.

Round 4

Within Appraisers

Between Appraisers
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Evaluation of the Overall Attribute Agreement Analysis Approach
Individual and joint bias is reported in the Each Appraiser versus Standard and All Appraisers versus Standard
agreement. Round Two Each Appraiser versus Standard agreement ranged 82.46% to 89.47%, and the Round Three
agreement ranged 77.91% to 82.82%. Correspondingly, the Round Two All Appraisers versus Standard agreement
was 75.44%, and the Round Three was 67.48%. Repeatability is reported in the Within Appraisers agreement. Testing
Round Three Within Appraisers agreement ranged 85.28% to 93.25%, and Round Four ranged 79.44% to 92.78%.
Reproducibility is reported in the Between Appraisers agreement. Round Three was 72.39%, and Round Four was
53.33%.
Exhibit 4 reports Fleiss’ kappa statistics for Round Three and Four Between Appraisers item agreement and
for Round Three All Appraisers versus Standard item agreement. The HFACS category level, Round Three Between
Appraisers item agreement ranged 70.84% for SI to 97.48% for 97.19% for OP. The dummy variable assignments
ranged 95.94% for PD to 97.76% for AD. The “N” no assignment was 60.64%, or, given the standard errors,
statistically less than the category level and dummy variable assignments. The corresponding Round Four Between
Appraisers item agreement ranged 55.35% for AE2 to 88.45% for SI within the HFACS categories and 76.23% for
PD to 98.06% for SD within the dummy variable assignments. The “N” no assignment was 47.01%, again statistically
less than the category level and dummy variable assignments. Exhibit 4 also reports the Round Three All Appraisers
versus Standard Fleiss’ kappa statistics. The HFACS category item agreement ranged 81.79% for PP to 98.66% for
OP. Category SI appears to have been an outlier at the category level with agreement of 39.28%. The dummy variable
assignments ranged 88.52% for SD to 98.84% for AD. The “N” no assignment was 48.89%, again statistically less
than the category level and dummy variable assignments.
Exhibit 5 presents the summary of the Attribute Agreement Analysis method applied to establish and evaluate
HFACS inter-rating reliability of the raters.

Conclusions
The overall attribute agreement analysis approach was found to be potentially viable as a method for providing
feedback during the training of aviators and validating rater reliability in the classification of aircraft mishaps within
the HFACS framework. Examination of the Round Two to Round Four percent agreement suggests that forgetting
set in rather quickly after training. Within Appraisers average percent agreements from Round Two to Round Four
declined from 90.64% to 88.96% to 83.70%. The Each Appraiser versus Standard declined from 86.55% to 80.78%
from Round Two to Round Three, and the All Appraisers versus Standard declined from 75.44% to 67.48%. The
Between Appraisers average percent agreement declined from 77.19% to 72.39% to 53.33% from Round Two to
Round Four, and the Round Four agreement of 53.33% was below the Round Two and Three 95% lower confidence
limits of 64.16% and 64.86% respectively, indicating that Round Four Between Appraisers average percent agreement
was statistically different from Rounds Two and Three. All Round Two through Four average agreement percentages
were above the required minimum 50% agreement established from the literature review.
Forgetting was evident also in the Round Three and Round Four Between Appraisers inter-rater reliability
summaries using Fleiss’s kappa statistics. The HFACS category average agreement Between Appraisers kappa
declined from 86.67% for Round Three to 75.60% for Round Four. Likewise, the dummy variable kappa declined
from 96.91% to 88.35%. The Round Three HFACS category average agreement All Appraisers versus Standard was
95.37%, and the dummy variable All Appraisers versus Standard was 94.31%. Thus, reproducibility and bias relative
to the standard were relatively equivalent.
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Exhibit 4. Inter-rater Reliability Summary Data Using Fleiss’s Kappa Statistic.
Response

Kappa

Std Err

Z

P(vs> 0)

Round 3 Between Appraisers

Response

Kappa

Std Err

Z

P(vs> 0)

Round 4 Between Appraisers

OR

0.81624

0.0202237

40.361 0.0000

OR

0.827586

0.0192450

43.003 0.0000

OP

0.97191

0.0202237

48.058 0.0000

OP

0.827586

0.0192450

43.003 0.0000

OD

0.97475

0.0202237

48.199 0.0000

OD

0.903898

0.0192450

46.968 0.0000

SI

0.70842

0.0202237

35.030 0.0000

SI

0.884497

0.0192450

45.960 0.0000

SP

0.88680

0.0202237

43.850 0.0000
SV

0.664804

0.0192450

34.544 0.0000

SD

0.96451

0.0202237

47.692 0.0000

SD

0.980623

0.0192450

50.955 0.0000

PE

0.87284

0.0202237

43.160 0.0000

PE

0.706681

0.0192450

36.720 0.0000

PC

0.92742

0.0202237

45.858 0.0000

PC

0.789679

0.0192450

41.033 0.0000

PP

0.78096

0.0202237

38.616 0.0000

PP

0.820659

0.0192450

42.643 0.0000

PD

0.95937

0.0202237

47.438 0.0000

PD

0.762322

0.0192450

39.611 0.0000

AE1

0.95325

0.0202237

47.135 0.0000

AE1

0.917719

0.0192450

47.686 0.0000

AE2

0.91236

0.0202237

45.114 0.0000

AE2

0.553529

0.0192450

28.762 0.0000

AE3

0.90699

0.0202237

44.848 0.0000

AE3

0.567702

0.0192450

29.499 0.0000

AV

0.79709

0.0202237

39.414 0.0000

AD

0.97764

0.0202237

48.342 0.0000

AD

0.887003

0.0192450

46.090 0.0000

N

0.60640

0.0202237

29.985 0.0000

N

0.470165

0.0192450

24.430 0.0000

Overall

0.87944

0.0064759

135.80 0.0000

Overall

0.765485

0.0068589

111.60 0.0000

The main contribution of this study to inter-rater reliability analysis of the assignment of HFACS codes to
aircraft accident reports was the application of attribute agreement analysis methodology in the Methods section. As
noted, given that there are three “Organizational Influences” categories, four “Unsafe Supervision” categories, three
“Preconditions for Unsafe Acts” categories, and four “Unsafe Acts” categories plus one dummy variable for each
category level, there are 18 categories and 4 × 5 × 4 × 5 = 400 path classifications for each aircraft accident under the
HFACS. This number of path classifications can be multiplied further, since USAF experts assign category codes that
create partial paths and multiple paths within the same accident report. Thus, assignment of an accident report to a
discrete path classification is not always possible. The attribute agreement analysis inter-rater reliability method
developed as part of this work overcame this need for discrete path classification by:
1. Treating each HFACS categorical level as an independent assignment. This decomposed each path by
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model to four independent classification problems.
2. Adding a dummy variable to each HFACS categorical level as a pass-through category for accidents in
which USAF investigators did not make code assignment for the given level.
3. Normalizing the data into a Poisson counting process within a respective category.
These modifications allowed each path to be treated as arising from a multiplicative process of independent variables.
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Exhibit 4 (continued). Inter-rater Reliability Summary Data Using Fleiss’s Kappa Statistic.
Response

Kappa

Std Err

Z

P(vs> 0)

Response

Kappa

Std Err

Z

P(vs> 0)

Round 3 All Appraisers vs Standard
OR

0.88680

0.0319765

27.733 0.0000

OP

0.98664

0.0319765

30.855 0.0000

OD

0.98564

0.0319765

30.824 0.0000

SI

0.39276

0.0319765

12.282 0.0000

SP

0.84607

0.0319765

26.459 0.0000

SD

0.88517

0.0319765

27.682 0.0000

PE

0.91694

0.0319765

28.675 0.0000

PC

0.94316

0.0319765

29.495 0.0000

PP

0.81787

0.0319765

25.577 0.0000

PD

0.91334

0.0319765

28.563 0.0000

AE1

0.95327

0.0319765

29.811 0.0000

AE2

0.84193

0.0319765

26.329 0.0000

AE3

0.95133

0.0319765

29.751 0.0000

AD

0.98835

0.0319765

30.908 0.0000

N

0.48894

0.0319765

15.290 0.0000

Overall

0.84895

0.0099721

85.133 0.0000

The inter-rater reliability procedure developed in this work is designed to verify the individual rater’s
reliability before and after training and continuing into practice. The first step was to establish the measurement
standard for acceptable inter-rater agreement. To this end, this work relied on a prior study by O’Connor, et al. (2010)
indicating only a 55% agreement among raters of aircraft accident reports. This study set the standard for between
rater agreement and all raters’ agreement to experts’ classification at greater than or equal to 50% average or 50/50
odds of random assignment classification. A similar procedure can be applied in actual practice to continually identify
and revise the state of “certified” accident investigators’ joint inter-rater capability.
The second contribution was the tradeoff analysis between confidence in the difference to detect and the
sampling resolution over a range of sample sizes to select a sample size that provided ≥ 90% confidence in detecting
differences between any two raters from the p = 0.50 base random assignment case. Again, the difference to detect
and sampling resolution can, and should be, incorporated into certifying accident investigators’ joint inter-rater
capability.
The third contribution was the development of the eight-step rater reliability method in the Methods section.
The pre-classification and inter-rater testing attribute agreement analyses can continue for multiple rounds until the
between raters and all raters’ agreement to experts’ classification achieve some agreed upon average agreement rating
standard. The pre-classification and inter-rater testing attribute agreement analysis establishes a trainee rater’s
reliability a priori to rating a body of accident summaries. After rating the accident summaries, the post inter-rater
testing by classifying a random sample of the trainee classified summaries, in this study the 30 random samples from
the 272 classified accident summaries, by the trainee and reference raters should demonstrate inter-rater reliability
greater than or equal to the established standard for “certification” to be awarded. Procedures should be developed to
periodically re-certify accident investigators inter-reliability agreement as continuing to meet the established standard.
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Exhibit 5. Summary of the Attribute Agreement Analysis method for inter rater reliability.
PHASE

ACTIONS

TRAINING

Didactic training, 10 reports from 75 detailed HFACS coded
discussing and reports
reviewing
detailed reports

Round1

TESTING

Round2

Round3

NUMBER of the REPORTS

Standard Used

2 replicates with 10 reports from 75 detailed HFACS coded
Already coded by
1-week interval reports
AIB panel experts
by 3 pilots
in the detailed
2 replicates with 10 reports from 75 detailed HFACS coded reports
1-week interval reports
by 3 pilots
2 replicates with 30 reports from 75 detailed HFACS coded
1-week interval reports (2 of the 30 reports were insufficient
by 3 pilots
in data)
Rating by the test 272 reports – executive summaries- which HFACS taxonomy
subject pilot
don’t have the detailed HFACS coding

EVALUATION

Round4

2 replicates with Random 30 reports from 272 reports without Test Subject pilot’s
1-week interval coding
codings
by 3 pilots

Finally, the categorical level classification scheme developed for this work transformed the HFACS
classification data into a format suitable for attribute agreement analysis. Each categorical level was assigned multiple
rows, one for each category assigned within the level. This allowed for multiple category assignments within a
category level. In addition to the category codes and the dummy variable code, a code of “N” was assigned to show
disagreement between raters within a categorical level or of a rater with himself between replicates.
Future research is planned to extend this attribute agreement analysis approach to HFACS inter-rater reliability at the
nanocode level and then to validate the approach through research using USAF accident investigators and pilot
trainees. Originally, the researchers gathered nanocode level causal assignment data and tried to apply attribute
agreement analysis at the nanocode level. Attribute agreement analysis using nanocodes was possible at the n = 10
accident reports used in the Round One and Two training phase. However, the number of nanocode categories
exceeded the allowed 50 categories in Minitab for the Round Three and Four n = 28 and n = 30 required to maintain
the 90% confidence to detect at least a 10% difference from the minimum average agreement of 50% used in this
study. Extension of this methodology to the USAF accident investigators and pilot trainees will require securing
support from the United States Air Force.
The distinguishing feature of this study is that the attribute agreement analysis is used for the inter-rater
reliability of DOD HFACS coding by including training, testing and evaluation of the rater. Thus, the study provided
that the subject test pilot can rate the DOD HFACS based accidents.
The study by Ergai et al. (2016) suggests that training might also incorporate the use of a classification tool or
flowchart, with the intention of increasing the reliability of HFACS for future training. In fact, a well-established
nanocode in the taxonomy under the causal categories can be used instead of a flowchart; the raters use the nanocodes
as an explanatory feature for the accident reports. Using only the causal levels for accident classification may not be
sufficient to rate the causes precisely. In this study, the raters used the nanocodes under the categories in DOD HFACS
that helped them to rate the causes of the accidents better.

Recommendations
The inter-rater reliability study methodology developed in this work can be conducted to establish and improve
assessment reliability for any aviation organization applying the HFACS directly or any organization in another sector
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adapting the HFACS system to its sector. Other sectors will have to develop their own respective accident categorical
level classification schemes and adapt the methodology for assessment and possibly certification of raters.
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